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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under §78-2a3(2)(g).

Also, the district court apparently sent the appeal to

the Utah Supreme Court despite the fact that the Notice of Appeal
indicated the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Utah Supreme Court, in

turn, referred this case to this court stating that Padilla v.
Board of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991), was controlling.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was Mr. Neel denied the inherent and inalienable right to

enjoy and defend his liberty guaranteed by Article I, Section 1, of
the Utah Constitution in that the Utah Board of Pardons procedures
in effect at his parole hearing denied him assistance of counsel
and the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him?
2.

Was Mr. Neel denied the right to confront witnesses

against him and be fully advised of the accusation against him
contrary to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and contrary to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution in
that the Board of Pardons refused to allow him to review his Board
of Pardons file prior to what amounted to a re-sentencing?
3.

Was Mr. Neel denied his Sixth Amendment, Article I,

Section 12 right to counsel in the course of sentencing by the
Board of Pardons7 procedures and regulations in effect at the time
of his July, 1991, parole hearing?
4.

Was Mr. Neel denied due process of law under the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section

1

7 of the Utah Constitution by the rules and procedures in effect of
the Board of Pardons applicable to his July, 1991, parole hearing?
These issues are raised on appeal of the granting of a Motion
to Dismiss.

The standard of review for these issues are that this

court should construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in his
favor.

The decision of the district court should be affirmed only

should it appear to> a certainty that the plaintiff would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of his claims.

Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. , 790

P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990).
this

court

need

Stewart v. Utah.

not

As only issues of law are presented,

defer

to

the

trial

court's

conclusions.

184 Utah Adv. Rep. 77 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE LAW

The verbatim text of the following provisions appear in the
Addendum:
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Article I, Section 1, Utah Constitution;
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution;
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution;
Board of Pardons Regulation R655-303;
Board of Pardons Regulation R655-308;
§77-27-3 (1982 e d ) ;
§77-27-11 (1982 ed).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This action is one in habeas corpus by an inmate at the Utah
State Prison, David Neel.
order his release.

Mr. Neel is not requesting the court

Instead, he is asking that the courts order

that he receive a fair parole hearing conducted in accordance with
requirements of the state and federal constitutions.
B.
On October

Course of Proceedings

16, 1991, David Neel

filed

a Complaint for

Extraordinary Writ — Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District
Court.

A new version of Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure had just gone into effect wherein the State was not
required to answer until the district court had made an independent
determination of whether the action could proceed.

Despite that

rule, the State filed an Answer, Response, and Motion to Dismiss.
Mr. Neel filed a Memorandum in Response to the State's Motion
to Dismiss and a hearing was held before the Honorable Homer
Wilkinson on January 3, 1992.

The court entered an Order of

Dismissal of the entire Complaint of Mr. Neel on January 15, 1992.
This appeal was timely filed on February 18, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No trial was held at the district court level to determine
facts.

As this appeal is taken from a Motion to Dismiss, the

relevant facts which are construed in favor of the petitioner are
found by reading the Complaint filed by the petitioner.
3

Those

facts are summarized next from the Complaint found at Record pp. 219.
On November 18, 1983, David Neel was sentenced by the Fourth
Judicial District Court after entering a guilty plea for the
offense of sexual abuse of a child under §76-5-404.1. Mr. Neel was
sentenced to a term of five years to life. This offense was at the
time a first degree felony.

The legislature has subsequently

reduced the nature of the offense to a second degree felony but Mr.
Neel's sentencing as a first degree felony remained in effect.
Mr. Neel was committed to the Utah State Prison in Draper,
Utah.

On February 27, 1990, he was paroled to a halfway house in

Salt Lake City. Unfortunately, on April 6, 1990, Mr. Neel breached
his parole agreement by walking away from the halfway house.

He

was arrested seven days later in his home state of Pennsylvania.
No evidence exists of the plaintiff committing any criminal offense
during his absence except the offense of breaching his parole
agreement.
A parole revocation hearing was held before the Utah Board of
Pardons on July 18, 1990.
parole violation.

Mr. Neel pled guilty to the charge of

He was advised by the Board of Pardons at that

time that a rehearing concerning his parole would be held before
the full Board in February, 1991.
The February, 1991, hearing was delayed at the request of the
Department of Corrections and was not held until July 26, 1991. A
result of that hearing was to deny the petitioner immediate parole
and merely reschedule another hearing for August, 1992.
4

During the July 26, 1991, hearing plaintiff had present legal
counsel to assist him in his presentation.

Counsel was denied the

opportunity to speak in the hearing and was not even allowed upon
request to sit by the plaintiff.

The Board of Pardons invoked

regulation R655-308 limiting any presentation of the offender to
himself.
During the course of the parole hearing, Mr. Neel was advised
that there were psychological

reports and other unidentified

information contained in his file which he would not be allowed to
review despite request but which would be considered in making a
decision concerning his parole.
Counsel for Mr. Neel made written demand on the Board of
Pardons for complete access to his file at the Department of
Corrections so as to be able to examine and prepare a response to
the material which was being considered in his parole.

This

request appears as Exhibit "E" to the plaintiff's Complaint.
Record, p. 15.

The Board of Pardons responded to the written

request, contained at Exhibit "F" to the Complaint, with a notice
that there would be no change in the position of the Board.
Record, p. 17.
Mr. Neel then filed his Complaint for Extraordinary Writ

—

Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court in October,
1991, asking the district court to order the Utah Board of Pardons
to conduct a hearing concerning his parole in which he would be
allowed active representation by counsel and access to information

5

which was being utilized by the Board of Pardons in considering his
eligibility for parole.

Record, p. 2.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. Neel claims that under the indeterminate sentencing system
in Utah that his parole hearing of July 26, 1991, was actually a
sentencing proceeding.

This sentencing proceeding is a critical

stage for constitutional purposes to which rights attach under the
federal and Utah Constitutions. These rights include the right to
enjoy and defend liberty, the right to confront the witnesses, the
right to be fully advised of the accusations against him, and his
due process rights.
The regulations of the Board of Pardons which deny Mr. Neel
access to critical information used against him and which denies
him right to counsel are unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction

In Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized due process rights under the federal
and state Constitutions may attach to proceedings before the Utah
Board of Pardons.

None of those rights were defined in that case

and remand was done for a hearing as to what rights, if any, Mr.
Foote had been denied.
The district court in this case made essentially the same
mistake as the district court in Foote.

That is, questions were

presented to the court as to whether Mr. Neel had been denied
6

rights in consideration
Constitutions.

for parole under the U.S. and state

The district court, without hearing on the facts,

dismissed Mr. Neel's claims. Fortunately, specific constitutional
rights were pled in Mr. Neel's Complaint so that this court, upon
the standard of review of assuming the facts to be as pled in the
Complaint, may make analysis and rule whether those particular
constitutional rights are recognized.

This is the very kind of

case which Foote anticipated would be needed to define the body of
rights one has under indeterminate sentencing.
B.

Legal Framework of Sentencing

To fully appreciate the deprivation of rights which has
occurred, one must have firmly in mind the sentencing procedures in
Utah courts and how they interrelate with the Utah Board of
Pardons.
Mr. Neel pled guilty to sexual abuse of a child, a first
degree felony, under §76-5-404.1 in 1983. He was sentenced under
§76-3-203 which specifically provides that a felony of the first
degree carries an "indeterminate term" of not less than five years
and which may be for life.

At the time of his sentencing, the

Board of Pardons determined the length of actual time to be served.
See, §77-27-3 and §77-27-11 (1982 ed) in addendum.
At the time of Mr. Neel's July, 1990, parole hearing, the
governing law for the Board of Pardons was still Title 77, Chapter
27.

While this Chapter had undergone some revision since Mr. Neel

was

incarcerated, it continued

to generally provide

for the

existence of a Board of Pardons and further provide that the Board
7

of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and under what
conditions all persons in prison for a felony may be released.
The Board of Pardons has implemented their responsibilities in
part by adopting Board of Pardons regulation R655 found in the Utah
Administrative Code. The regulation provides in R655-303 that all
information submitted to the Board of Pardons is available for
review by the offender unless specifically classified as confidential. R655-308 provides that an offender has a right to assistance
at a parole hearing but counsel may not speak at a hearing of this
type.
The practical effect of the sentencing statutes and of the
statutes governing the Board of Pardons is that the Utah Board of
Pardons actually does the sentencing of felony criminal defendants.
See. Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
C. The Right to Defend Liberty Under the
Utah Constitution Applied to the Parole Hearing.
The first article of the Utah Constitution is a Declaration of
Rights.

Section 1 specifically provides:
All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; . . .

Unfortunately, case law was not found which specifically interprets
the meaning of this phrase for this or other state constitutions.
See N.M. Const, art. I, §4; Idaho Const, art. I, §1; Mont. Const.
art. II, §3.

Other cases have considered the meaning of the

subsequent phrases governing rights of speech and property.

It is

apparent from reading the cases pertaining to these other Section
8

1 rights that the Utah courts have traditionally recognized this
Section as listing some of the most important and fundamental
rights that are part of Utah citizenship.

See, State v. Interna-

tional Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). The obvious question
raised in the context of a criminal proceeding is what does it mean
under the Utah Constitution to have inherent and inalienable rights
to enjoy and defend liberty?
In the absence of case law, one may look to other recognized
sources of authority to interpret this section.

Certainly, a

review of the intent expressed in the constitutional convention is
an aid to construction.

Cooper v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 35 Utah

570, 102 P. 202 (1909).

Also, rules of construction are helpful.

These rules include that all language of the constitution should be
given effect where possible. Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah
112, 263 P. 78 (1927).

Also, the constitution should be read as a

whole so that every part is to be given effect, where possible.
ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
693 P.2d 811 (Cal. 1985).
The way to harmonize article I, section 1 and the entire
Declaration of Rights while following the rule of construction to
give effect to language where possible is to hold that the right to
enjoy and defend liberty at least includes the fundamental rights
contained in the entire article I. Furthermore, the right to enjoy
and defend liberty appears to be a broader concept than the
itemized rights contained in article I.

See, Justice Crockett's

dissent in State v. Piepenbura, 571 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977).
9

For

example, article I, section 7, contains a due process clause which
implies defending one's liberty is something more than due process
alone.

The logical effect of section 1 is to guarantee to the

citizens of Utah that article I rights attach whenever liberty is
threatened.
There is no question that liberty is threatened under the
indeterminate sentencing system in which a parole hearing is held.
The very purpose of the hearing is to determine the act and
duration of incarceration.
In summary, article I, section 1 makes a general statement
that the defense of liberty

is a fundamental right of Utah

citizenship.

The first question encountered is when does that

right attach.

The structure of article 1 suggests that the right

to defend liberty attaches whenever one's liberty is threatened.
The second question which arises is the scope of the right to
enjoy and defend liberty. Section 1 does not define the scope, but
life is given to section 1 by recognizing the Declaration of Rights
as a whole and applying substantive specific rights out of the
other sections of article I.
D. Mr. Neel was Denied His Rights to
Confront the Witnesses and to be Informed of the
Accusation Against Him Guaranteed by
Article I, Section 12.
Having determined that article I, section 1 applies the
Declaration of Rights to a parole hearing, Mr. Neel may identify
his rights under the Utah Constitution denied him by the Board of
Pardons procedure in effect at the time of his hearing. The first
10

right denied is the article I, section 12 right to confront the
witnesses against him.

Additionally, and closely related, he was

denied the article I, section 12 right ". . .to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof. .
it

• •

As alleged in the Complaint, Mr. Neel demanded access to the
psychological

reports being used against him.

This request

constitutes an attempt to exercise his right to have a copy of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

This fundamental

right was recognized long ago in State v. Topham, 41 Utah 39, 123
P. 888 (1912).

The court explained there in the context of an

indictment that a defendant is entitled to know with reasonable
certainty with what he is charged so as to be able to protect
himself.

Obviously, a parole hearing is sufficiently analogous

that the same right would attach. Mr. Neel's parole revocation was
to be based upon what apparently was contained in the psychological
reports but he was not ever advised of the conclusions of those
reports.
Mr. Neel found himself having to appear to answer conclusions
reached by psychologists which would not be disclosed to him other
than they apparently justified a reversal of the earlier conclusion
he was substantively worthy of release. This inmate found himself
in the position of no assistance of counsel, responding to substantive conclusions of experts, and having no resources to make a
response.

The procedure utilized by the Board of Pardons in

refusing to supply the information to Mr. Neel offends reasonable
11

notions of justice and certainly is against the intent of the
Declaration of Rights.
Not only was Mr. Neel denied the right to have a copy of the
nature of the accusation against him as guaranteed by section 12,
but the Board procedures in effect at the time of his hearing did
not allow him to confront those making the conclusions as guaranteed by section 12.
306, et seq.

In I Proceedings, Constitutional Convention

(March 23, 1895), the Utah Constitutional Convention

considered the use of depositions in criminal proceedings as part
of the debate concerning article I, section 12. That discussion,
not repeated here, shows that a recognized fundamental right under
the Utah Constitution was that witnesses be subject to crossexamination.

Indeed, it was stated that there could be "no fair

defense" without that right.

Face to face confrontation of the

witnesses was extolled as the only way to have a fair trial.
Taking into account that the United States Constitution also
guarantees confrontation of the witnesses, one is hard pressed to
find a more fundamental right which should attach.

The question

again presented is whether that right attaches in the parole
hearing context. As explained above, article I, section 1 has the
effect of attaching the Declaration of Rights to whenever liberty
is threatened.
This court has recognized that a presentence report should be
disclosed to a defendant in order to allow an adequate opportunity
to respond.

State v. Sweat, 722 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1986); State v.

Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980).
12

The psychological reports used

here can be analogized to a presentence report to a trial judge.
The same importance attaches because the information is utilized to
determine an appropriate term in prison.

This information arises

solely out of the state's effort and may not be independently
learned by the inmate assuming he had the resources to do so.
The circumstances in which Mr. Neel finds himself is that he
was found to be suitable for release into the community.

When he

was no longer being punished for having walked away from the
halfway house, his extension of sentence became not additional
punishment for what he did, but shifted to punishing him for what
the state believes him to be.

He cannot fairly challenge this

resentencing without knowing what the state claims him to be
psychologically so that he may present a fair defense.
The failure to allow Mr. Neel to confront the additional
information contained in his Board of Pardons file constitutes a
denial of the right to confront witnesses which ought to be
remedied by this court declaring the Board of Pardons procedures to
be unconstitutional and ordering a new hearing held which comports
with article I, section 12.
E. Mr. Neel was Denied His Right
to Counsel Under Article I, Section 12*
The failure of the Board of Pardons to allow counsel to defend
the sentencing of Mr. Neel deprives him of the right to enjoy and
defend his liberty. As this court is well aware, there is a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages in the criminal
prosecution.

Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
13

Critical stage has been defined as any stage where counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair proceeding.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

This fundamental

right to counsel appears in the Utah Constitution in article I,
section

12.

The

question

presented,

therefore, is whether

sentencing under our indeterminate sentencing system constitutes a
critical stage for which the right to counsel attaches under both
the United States and Utah Constitutions.
Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.
State v. Casarezr 6f>6 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982).

Under our indetermi-

nate sentencing system, the Board of Pardons presides over the
sentencing procedure.

It follows naturally that the right to

counsel should attach whenever the Board of Pardons seeks to impose
what amounts to a sentence on the defendant.

Counsel should have

been allowed to defend on the resentencing and Rule R655-308 is
unconstitutional for denying that right.
F.

Due Process was Denied Mr. Neel

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no
person may be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Both
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Utah have
held that a prisoner does not have a right of expectation of parole
to which due process rights attach.

Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 1990).
These cases were presented to the district court by the state in

14

support of the argument that Mr. Neel has few, if any, rights in a
parole hearing.

Record, pp. 36 - 37.

In fact, these cases are not helpful to this court under the
circumstances presented here.

The courts there did not consider

the implication of an indeterminate sentencing system whereby the
focus of a parole hearing is not whether the prisoner should be
released but, instead, actually an act of sentencing wherein the
focus is how long should the prisoner be held. The distinction is
important because, as explained above, an act of sentencing is a
critical stage to which all constitutional rights attach while the
act of parole is an act of grace by the state to which rights do
not attach.
As explained in State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991), a
basic element of due process is that the defendant be given
adequate notice of the offense with which he is charged so that a
proper defense can be made. See, also, Christiansen v. Harris, 163
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945).

The heart of the Complaint of Mr. Neel is

that psychological evaluation information was contained in a file
utilized by the Board of Pardons to continue his incarceration, but
he was not given opportunity to examine it.

He knows only the

general conclusion that the information was not only adverse but
sufficiently adverse to justify reversal of the earlier decision to
release him.

One cannot reasonably conclude that he had adequate

notice of the basis of the sentencing act by the Board of Pardons
when he does not know what it is upon which the Board relies.

15

The regulations promulgated by the Board of Pardons denying
access to confidential information did not allow Mr. Neel fundamental fairness in learning why he was to held in prison longer after
he had been found once eligible for parole.

This fundamental

unfairness should be remedied by this court ordering another
hearing meeting the requirements of article I, section 7 and the
Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Board of Pardons found Mr. Neel substantively ready
for release on February 27, 1990.

By the time of his parole

hearing on July 26, 1991, he was no longer being punished for
having walked away from the halfway house, but was told by the
Board of Pardons that he was no longer fit for release into the
community. The only thing that changed on the substantive question
of his fitness for release were, apparently, some psychological
reports which he was not allowed to see.

Mr. Neel was asked to

defend himself without assistance of counsel and without knowing
what had changed.

He was, in effect, sentenced to a longer term

without any of the rights which usually attach under the Utah and
United States Constitutions to one being sentenced.
This court is respectfully requested to declare the regulations of the Utah Board of Pardons unconstitutional so far as they
deny one in a hearing to determine the length of the sentence the
right to examine the information used against him and to have
assistance of counsel.

The court is further requested to order

that Mr. Neel be allowed a hearing before the Utah Board of Pardons
16

in which he has had opportunity to examine all information used to
justify the length of his incarceration, opportunity to confront or
rebut that information, and assistance of counsel of his choice.
DATED this

ffr*'

day of May, 1992.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY J^'^ANDE'RS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID A NEEL,
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

TAMARA HOLDEN, et al^,

:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No, 910906541
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

:

The above entitled matter having come before this Court
on January 3, 1992, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff

was present and represented by Gregory J. Sanders, and Defendants
was represented by Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General.
This Court having heard oral argument from both parties and
having made its ruling, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

00078

2.

Petitioner's complaint for extraordinary writ of

habeas corpus is dismissed as meritless.
DATED this

day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

/ HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
/ Third District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing
Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gregory J.
Sanders, attorney for plaintiff, City Centre I,. #330, 175 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111-2314, this jf^day

of

January, 1992.

,s?P
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ADDENDUH B

77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power —
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. No fine or forfeiture
shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session
and after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing.
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfeitures shall be final.
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session,
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or termination of sentence.
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropriate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision.
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to section 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's performance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in section 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy
of the schedule and any modifications thereof.

77-27-11. Power of board to pardon or parole prisoner or terminate
his sentence — Determination of date prisoner eligible for parole. (1)
The board of pardons may pardon or parole any prisoner or commute or
terminate the sentence of any prisoner imprisoned in a state prison or a
county jail, unless otherwise provided by law.
(2) The board shall determine, within six months after the date of a
prisoner's commitment, the date upon which he shall be released on parole
or upon which his case shall be considered and shall promptly inform him
of the board's decision.

ADDENDUM C

R655-303. Offender Access to Informa*
tion.
R655-303-1. Policy.
R655-303-2. Procedure.
R655-303-1. Policy.
An offender shall have access to all information
relating to his case on which parole decisions are
made except that which is classified confidential.
R655-303-2. Procedure.
All material submitted to the Board, except that
which is specifically classified as confidential, shall
be available to be reviewed with the offender.
The Board may review the offender's record and
cover areas of concern during the hearing. The of'
fender may comment, clarify issues and ask questions
at the hearing.
Upon written request from the offender, copies of
requested information not classified as confidential
shall be provided at the offender's expense.

R655-308. Offender
tance.

Hearing

Assis-

R655-308-1. Policy.
R655-308-2. Procedure.
R655-308-1. Policy.
It is the policy of the Board of Pardons to allow an
offender to have such assistance from other persons
as may be required in preparation for a Board hearing.
R655-308-2. Procedure.
Family, friends, professionals, interpreters, case
workers, and minority representatives are allowed to
be present at hearings and may assist the offender in
preparing his case.
An attorney shall be retained by the State to represent all parolees who desire representation at Parole
Revocation hearings before the Board of Pardons.
However, an alleged parole violator may choose to
have a private attorney represent him at his own expense.
Except as otherwise provided by law, no person
other than the offender may address the Board at any
hearing except for the offender's attorney at a Parole
Revocation hearing, or such persons as the Board
may find necessary to the orderly conducting of any
hearing.

ADDENDUM D

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty - No property qualifiesJ
* rw K
?
°r
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment
— Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]

Section
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16> [ N o imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
Soldiers voting.]
1 7 [Elec tions to be free 18
' [Attainder - Ex post facto laws - Impairr
r
.
. ,
_
?*
T
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i
1Q
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20
- [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.)
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eryoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
ona°w PerS ° n S h a 1 1 b e

deprived 0f life libert

'

*

or

P«>Perty, without due process

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Jt

day of May, 1992, I caused

four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Paul Van Dam, Esq.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Lorenzo K. Miller, Esq.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Defendants
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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